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I. INTRODUCTION: THE SIREN CALL OF COMMUNITARIAN FREE 
SPEECH THEORY 
The theory of communitarianism has always had a special appeal to 
Americans. It is more satisfying to focus on what holds us together than on 
what keeps us apart, or—even worse—what keeps us at odds. Thus, after 9/11, 
in a show of American solidarity, members of Congress from both parties 
gathered together on the steps of the Capitol and sang the Star Spangled 
Banner.1 Holidays like the Fourth of July and symbols such as the American 
flag and the Pledge of Allegiance are undoubtedly designed to make us all feel 
part of a unified whole, sharing a common purpose. There is, of course, 
nothing wrong with such symbolic forms of connection among Americans. 
However, it is when the assumed inter-connectivity is taken beyond the level 
of the symbolic and extended to core notions of political theory that we should 
become concerned. For it is far too easy to make the short leap from 
communitarian sharing of common purposes to societal condemnation of 
anyone who departs from some predetermined understanding of what those 
common purposes are. The result is, potentially at least, the suppression of 
differing views, which, ironically, would itself undermine what many consider 
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 1 Sunlen Miller & John Parkinson, Congress Sings God Bless America, ABC NEWS 
(Sept. 11, 2012, 1:11 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/09/congress-sings-
god-bless-america-on-9/11-anniversary/, archived at http://perma.cc/PMU7-KVAS. 
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our core “public purpose” to be—namely, preservation of the right of the 
individual to dissent from widely shared values and understandings. 
In the context of the theory of free expression, as Professor Krotoszynski’s 
cogent essay demonstrates,2 communitarian based theories have played an 
enormously important role in shaping our foundational understanding of the 
purposes of our national commitment to free and open communication. Indeed, 
many of the leading free speech theorists of the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries could, in one sense or another, be appropriately characterized as 
communitarian at their core. For example, as Professor Krotoszynski says,3 
Cass Sunstein’s free speech theory derives from a modern civic republican 
version of a communitarian pursuit of common public interests.4 Robert Post’s 
participatory theory of free expression is, in its essence, also focused on the 
pursuit of common purposes.5 More recently, relative newcomer Zephyr 
Teachout has proposed a theory that seeks to actually hold unconstitutional 
even private individuals’ attempts to influence governmental decision making 
for any reason other than pursuit of “the public interest.”6 But the father of all 
communitarian theories of free expression is the one first propounded in the 
late 1940s by Alexander Meiklejohn.7 Meiklejohn located the right of free 
expression exclusively in the listener.8 It was not important, he wrote, that 
everyone have the opportunity to speak, only that everything worthwhile be 
said.9 The voters need such an open flow of information and opinion, he 
reasons, in order to perform their function as the true governors in a 
democratic society.10 In Meiklejohn’s words, the “primary purpose of the First 
Amendment is . . . that all citizens shall, so far as possible, understand the 
                                                                                                                     
 2 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Free Speech Paternalism and Free Speech 
Exceptionalism: Pervasive Distrust of Government and the Contemporary First 
Amendment, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 659 (2015). 
 3 Id. at 667. 
 4 See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1576–78 
(1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Beyond]; see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE 
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 19‒23 (1993). 
 5 See Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of 
Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1115–23 (1993). But see MARTIN H. REDISH, 
THE ADVERSARY FIRST AMENDMENT: FREE EXPRESSION AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 31–32 (2013) (“Post has argued that ‘the value of individual 
autonomy is inseparable from the . . . aspiration for self-government.’ He has, moreover, 
insisted that ‘the ideal of autonomy is . . . foundational for the democratic process.’ In 
reality, however, Post’s commitment to autonomy—both individual and collective—is 
limited at best.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 6 Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 374 
(2009). 
 7 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 
(1948). 
 8 See id. at 25. 
 9 See id. (The First Amendment “does not require that . . . every citizen shall take 
part in public debate” nor that “everyone . . . have [the] opportunity to do so.”). 
 10 See id. at 24–26. 
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issues which bear upon our common life.”11 He disdained any focus on the 
private right to speak,12 and categorically rejected extending First Amendment 
protection to private lobbying efforts or commercial radio stations.13 Indeed, 
Meiklejohn drew a sharp distinction between “public” speech, which was to be 
fully protected by the First Amendment, and “private” speech, which was to be 
excluded from the scope of First Amendment protection, instead being 
relegated to the far more limited protection of the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause.14 
To be sure, the concept of a unified, widely understood “public interest” 
which we as members of society are all pursuing presents an attractive vision 
for Americans. The problems with the communitarian vision of free 
expression, however, are many, on at least three important levels. First, it is all 
too easy to identify the public interest with one’s own ideological perspective; 
after all, if one believes that one’s own beliefs represent moral and political 
truth, then expression advocating a contrary position must logically be against 
the public interest. Thus, an exclusive constitutional focus on speech deemed 
to pursue the public interest is potentially the first step on the road to 
imposition of viewpoint-based regulation. Indeed, investing any branch of 
government, including the judiciary, with power to ascertain whether, in the 
individual case, speech does or does not pursue the public interest provides a 
ready subterfuge for the imposition of viewpoint suppression. Second, the very 
decision to protect only speech designed to foster the public interest is in and 
of itself a form of viewpoint suppression. One widely accepted political-
economic ideology, associated with free market economics, posits that the 
“public interest” is nothing more than the sum total of each individual’s 
private interests.15 Therefore the very requirement that speech be designed to 
promote the public interest itself represents an implicit rejection of this 
economic viewpoint. Third, a forced focus on nothing but pursuit of the public 
interest undermines the individualism that is appropriately understood to 
underlie the liberal tradition. Individuals are permitted to pursue and protect 
their own personal values and interests, regardless of whether some external, 
objective arbiter would find that interest to overlap with that of the public in 
general. 
It is my view that any model of free speech theory grounded purely in 
notions of some form of communitarian pursuit of the public interest ignores a 
real understanding of what America’s democratic society is all about. Even 
casual examinations of American political history demonstrates that it has 
been pluralism and diversity, rather than some sort of homogeneous consensus 
on virtually all matters, that inherently characterizes America’s form of 
                                                                                                                     
 11 Id. at 88–89 (emphasis added). 
 12 See supra text accompanying notes 8–9. 
 13 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 7, at 39. 
 14 Id. at 39–40; see U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 15 JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 17 (1980).  
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democracy. In this Essay, I will argue the following: (1) America’s political 
and constitutional traditions have, for the most part, focused upon managing 
conflicts among competing groups of individuals in a manner designed to 
preserve the essential elements of democracy; (2) the best way to visualize 
such management is by an analogy to John Rawls’s state of nature behind the 
veil of ignorance; (3) the guarantee of free expression is appropriately viewed 
as one form—and arguably the most important form—of political conflict 
management; (4) the skepticism inherent in this conflict management version 
of American political theory should be seen as a means of preserving and 
promoting human flourishing; and (5) the mistrust of government’s power to 
censor individual expression does not automatically extend to an equal 
mistrust of governmental power to regulate private conduct.  
The next section of this Essay explores the history and theory of the 
conflict management model of American democratic theory, finding it to 
inhere in the structure of the nation’s constitutional and political structure.16 
The section also visualizes the American system of constitutional management 
of conflict by means of an analogy to the Rawlsian framework.17 The section 
that follows emphasizes the optimistic element of the skepticism inherent in 
our form of democracy, discussing the important intersection between 
skepticism and mistrust on the one hand and human flourishing on the other.18 
The final section will draw a distinction between mistrust of governmental 
suppression of expression on the one hand and governmental regulation of 
conduct on the other hand.19 
II. JOHN RAWLS, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, AND THE VALUE OF 
MUTUAL MISTRUST 
The struggle for American political theory has been to avoid the dark 
pathologies that potentially plague conflicts that inhere in a pluralistic society. 
In short, the goal has been to manage the conflict inherent in social and 
political diversity in a manner that prevents degeneration into tyranny. This 
can only be achieved by starting from a principle of universal mistrust, or, to 
put it another way, “in God we trust: all others pay cash.”20 But naked 
mistrust, standing alone, could easily lead to widespread “prisoners’ dilemma” 
problems21 and as a result degeneration into a political state of nature where, 
                                                                                                                     
 16 See infra Part II. 
 17 See infra Part II. 
 18 See infra Part III. 
 19 See infra Part IV. 
 20 I take the phrase from the well-known book by humorist Jean Shepherd. JEAN 
SHEPHERD, IN GOD WE TRUST, ALL OTHERS PAY CASH (1966). 
 21 For a detailed description of the so-called “prisoners’ dilemma,” see REDISH, supra 
note 5, at 12–13. 
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as Thomas Hobbes warned, life is nasty, brutish and short.22 Instead, the 
mutual mistrust that rightfully pervades the relationships among individuals 
and groups must be channeled in ways that place a democratic floor below the 
adversary battle among different interest groups and ideologies.23 Our 
constitutional structure in general and the First Amendment in particular 
represent that floor.24 
Perhaps the best way to articulate the rationale behind this “adversary” 
version of American democracy is to draw on an analogy to the famed 
political philosopher, John Rawls. One need not accept all of Rawls’s 
controversial moral conclusions to recognize the intuitive value of his 
imaginary constructs as to the beginnings of civilized society. Rawls first 
imagines individuals in a pre-societal state of nature, what he refers to as “the 
original position.”25 In this original position, he presumes that “the 
parties . . . are equal. That is, all have the same rights in the procedure for 
choosing principles [that will govern society once it is formed]; each can make 
proposals, submit reasons for their acceptance, and so on.”26  
Most importantly, for my purposes, is that Rawls assumes that the parties 
in this original position “are situated behind a veil of ignorance. They do not 
know how the various alternatives will affect their own particular case and 
they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of general 
considerations.”27 Thus, for those in the original position: 
[N]o one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor 
does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his 
intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor, again, does anyone know his 
conception of the good, the particulars of his rational plan of life, or even the 
special features of his psychology such as his aversion to risk or liability to 
optimism or pessimism.28  
Moreover, Rawls assumes:  
that the parties do not know the particular circumstances of their own society. 
That is, they do not know its economic or political situation, or the level of 
civilization and culture it has been able to achieve. The persons in the original 
position have no information as to which generation they belong. . . . They 
                                                                                                                     
 22 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 77 (A.P. Martinich ed., Broadview Press Ltd. 
2002) (1651). 
 23 See REDISH, supra note 5, at 136–41. 
 24 See U.S. CONST. arts. I, II & III, amend. I. 
 25 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 17 (1971) (“[T]he original position is the 
appropriate initial status quo which insures that the fundamental agreements reached in it 
are fair . . . . [W]e have to ascertain which principles it would be rational to adopt given the 
contractual situation.”). 
 26 Id. at 19. 
 27 Id. at 136–37. 
 28 Id. at 137. 
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must choose principles the consequences of which they are prepared to live 
with whatever generation they turn out to belong to.29 
However, in this mythical pre society Rawls does assume that individuals 
“know the general facts about human society. They understand political affairs 
and the principles of economic theory; they know the basis of social 
organization and the laws of human psychology.”30 
On the basis of this highly abstract construct, Rawls infers choices of risk 
averseness; those in the original position, for example, will be presumed not to 
decree that whites may suppress blacks or that men may suppress women, 
because they don’t know themselves, behind this veil of ignorance, whether 
they will be white or black or male or female. As another famous political 
philosopher, Clint Eastwood’s character Dirty Harry, once put it, do you “feel 
lucky? Well, do ya, punk?”31 Both Rawls and Harry reflect a concern for the 
risk averseness that should rationally flow from a lack of key information as to 
one’s own power or status. 
One might dispute Rawls’s rather blanket assumption of universal moral 
risk averseness as a theoretical matter, but there is little doubt that something 
akin to that underlies the commitments made by our nation in ratification of 
the First Amendment to the Constitution. Arguably, this is especially true of 
the commitment to religious freedom. By its nature—at least in most cases of 
which we have been made aware—commitment to a particular religion 
inherently carries with it a form of epistemological arrogance, or a belief in 
some higher, indisputable truth. Why, then, should one who knows what is 
true tolerate blasphemers—those who pray to false or even evil gods? The 
most logical answer is that at the outset, one can never be certain that his or 
her religion will be in a position actually to suppress other religions. Indeed, 
for all they know (standing behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance), other 
religions will be in a far better position to suppress the decider’s religion than 
the other way around. In a dark game theory sort of way, then, the 
constitutional commitment to religious freedom made by men who firmly 
believed in the universal truth and moral superiority of their own religion is 
nothing more than Dirty Harry saying, “feel lucky. . . . punk?”32 Much the 
same could be said for the nation’s commitment to freedom of expression: one 
may privately be totally sure of the correctness or even truth of one’s own 
position, but one operating behind the veil of ignorance cannot be certain that 
                                                                                                                     
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Dirty Harry (1971) Quotes, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt066999/quotes (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/DC29-659H. 
 32 Id. One might respond that unlike those in the original position, the men who 
framed and ratified the First Amendment were not operating behind a veil of ignorance, but 
to the contrary, actually could be certain that their views were dominant. But those 
responsible for our Constitution were well aware of world history, where those in power 
were often replaced by others holding very different viewpoints. It is at this point that the 
risk averseness inherent in operating behind the veil of ignorance comes into play. 
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in the future she will be in a position to suppress the expression of false 
viewpoints. Indeed the opposite may well turn out to be the case. 
The First Amendment, then, is appropriately seen as a device designed (1) 
to recognize the inherent and pervasive potential for conflict among competing 
interests and value systems, and (2) to impose a type of “Marquess of 
Queensberry” set of procedural limitations on the operation of that conflict.33 
To be sure, in an adversary democracy there will be winners and losers. But 
the understanding of the First Amendment is that the winners may not silence 
or punish the losers, once again because at the point the initial agreement 
among all is made, all operate behind the veil of ignorance and therefore do 
not know whether they will turn out to be winners or losers once society 
begins. Moreover, even if they are winners the first time, much as the 
Federalists found in in the election of 1800, they may turn out to be big losers 
the next time. 
The pervasiveness of the adversary model of democracy in American 
society is far more than merely the result of a theoretical construct. One need 
only look to the very beginning of our constitutional tradition to see the 
dynamic of interest group conflict at work in the very framing of the 
Constitution.34 Madison’s famed Federalist No. 10 clearly reflects his 
awareness of the inevitability of faction within our society.35 It also reflects his 
effort to control this pathology, not through widespread suppression or some 
unrealistic, quixotic demand that everyone eschew personal interest to pursue 
some vague notion of the “public interest,” but rather through resort to 
prophylactic methods of governmental structure designed to dilute the 
potential strength of any one faction.36 Indeed, the entire structure of the 
American Constitution, with its intricate system of separation of powers and 
checks and balances,37 appears openly premised on a premise of mutual 
mistrust. Moreover, one need not possess a PhD in either political science or 
history to know that interest group politics—like it or not—have long 
dominated American society.38 To pretend American society is something it is 
not now and never has been by imagining a tightly knit community working 
towards widely accepted goals is to do a disservice to what our nation’s true 
political genius has been. And that is an ability to manage the inevitable 
                                                                                                                     
 33 Marquess of Queensberry Rules, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/366079/Marquess-of-Queensberry-rules (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/GG3U-456W. 
 34 For a detailed historical discussion of the pervasiveness of interest groups in 
American society, see REDISH, supra note 5, at 136–41. 
 35 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 71–77 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
 36 See id. 
 37 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. arts. I, II & III. 
 38 See REDISH, supra note 5, at 136–41 (describing historical pervasiveness and 
importance of interest groups in American society). 
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conflict among competing interests and values in a manner designed to 
preserve core notions of democratic practice and to avoid the onset of tyranny. 
III. THE CONCEPT OF SKEPTICAL OPTIMISM: MUTUAL MISTRUST, 
VIEWPOINT REGULATION, AND HUMAN FLOURISHING 
As dark as this view of human nature may appear to be, it also manifests 
an important element of optimism about the human condition that should not 
be ignored. First of all, those who decry the slavish pursuit of one’s own 
personal interests ignore the fact that on many occasions they themselves 
value just such behavior, albeit viewed through a very different ideological 
lens. When welfare recipients picket for an increase in their benefits, they are 
using expression as a means of pursuing their own personal interests, 
regardless of whether an increase in benefits would be beneficial to society as 
a whole. When African Americans protest violations of their civil rights, they, 
too, are employing expression as a means of advancing their own personal 
interests. To be sure, many of us may well give moral approval to such 
personal pursuits, but that fact makes them no less the pursuit of individual 
interest. It is likely, then, that many who decry narrow pursuit of one’s own 
interests are in reality condemning only those personal interests which they 
find morally offensive or with which they disagree. But it is at this point that 
the Rawlsian veil of ignorance must come into play, dictating that we cannot 
set up the rules of free expression selectively, on the basis of our own 
particular moral value system.39 For once such a principle is established, then 
those who hold the opposite viewpoint may just as rationally claim that when 
they take power they, too, may properly suppress expression of “offensive” 
viewpoints. The result is, once again, the very Hobbesian war of all against all 
that our entire system was designed to avoid in the first place. Feel lucky, 
punk? 
It is this reasoning that has properly led the Supreme Court to invoke the 
First Amendment to categorically prohibit government from suppressing 
viewpoints with which government disagrees or deems offensive.40 There 
logically can be no exceptions, because once the Court makes an exception for 
one particular viewpoint that it or the political branches of government deem 
especially offensive, it has left the door open to any group who takes power to 
selectively suppress the views that it happens to deem offensive.41 
It is for this reason that I cannot accept the assertion, discussed in 
Professor Krotoszynski’s essay,42 that other nations can be said to maintain an 
                                                                                                                     
 39 RAWLS, supra note 25, at 36–37. 
 40 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974) (“Under the First 
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.”). 
 41 I should note that a commitment to a total ban on viewpoint regulation does not 
necessarily imply a commitment to absolutism in First Amendment application. See infra 
Part V. 
 42 See Krotoszynski, Jr., supra note 2. 
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effective system of free expression despite their categorical exclusion of 
certain views widely deemed offensive. To be sure, I am not suggesting that 
democracy is an all-or-nothing process; this fact does not necessarily render 
these societies the moral equivalent of tyrannical rule. However, in 
recognizing the authority of those in power to exempt from constitutional 
protection certain substantive views deemed offensive, these societies have left 
open the logical possibility that others who take power will be equally able to 
suppress viewpoints which they deem offensive. That does not represent a true 
commitment to the principles of democratic free expression, as dictated by the 
risk averseness and formal epistemological humility that appropriately grow 
out of an assumption of the veil of ignorance. 
While acceptance of pluralism does have the potential to degenerate into 
power struggles and conflict, it also facilitates human flourishing far more than 
an exclusively communitarian perspective does. The liberal tradition has long 
been associated with a commitment to the notion of human growth and 
development.43 The paradox of our system, then, is that human flourishing can 
take place only when the darker aspects of human nature are recognized and 
checked.44 In this manner, the skepticism inherent in the notion of mutual 
mistrust effectively serves as a type of body guard for the more positive 
aspects of human nature.45 
This is not to say that individuals should be deemed to exist in a vacuum, 
untied to each other in any meaningful way. It would indeed be absurd to 
suggest that we function as totally free individuals, divorced from civilized 
society. But it surely does not follow that recognition of the individual as an 
integral unit worthy of respect and capable of growth and development plays 
no proper role in modern liberal political theory. Most forms of 
communitarianism effectively push individualism to the background, 
dangerously risking the equation of pursuit of individual interest with 
pathological selfishness worthy of societal condemnation. Even more 
dangerous is the potential for appeals to communitarian values to be 
manipulatively employed by individuals or groups as nothing more than a 
disguised means to suppress unpopular views. This is true of both the political 
right, as shown all too clearly by the McCarthy era, and by the political left, as 
demonstrated by the modern left wing version of civic republicanism’s attempt 
to exclude from the scope of the First Amendment speech deemed to promote 
values deemed morally offensive.46 Recognition of the inevitable battle among 
competing ideologies and interest groups for control, which characterizes the 
conflict management system of adversary democracy that is grounded in 
notions of mutual mistrust, enables us to see these appeals to vague notions of 
                                                                                                                     
 43 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 81 (1859). 
 44 See id. at 81–82. 
 45 See id. at 82–83. 
 46 See Sunstein, Beyond, supra note 4, at 1577–78; Teachout, supra note 6, at 383–87. 
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communitarian values for what they are. This recognition in turn enables us to 
prevent them from achieving their goals of selective suppression. 
IV. “I’M FROM THE GOVERNMENT AND I’M HERE TO HELP YOU”: 
DRAWING A SPEECH-CONDUCT DICHOTOMY 
While Professor Krotoszynski’s excellent essay for the most part 
perceptively describes and explains my theory of the adversary First 
Amendment,47 I do have one important bone to pick with him. He seems to 
assume that my objection to governmental suppression of truthful advertising 
of prescription drugs somehow also includes a constitutional objection to the 
entire system of FDA approval for prescription drugs.48 It is not uncommon 
for observers to collapse my commitment to free and open discussion and 
communication into a form of substantive libertarianism that I have never 
advocated.49 The mere fact that I believe in a strong constitutional 
commitment to free expression does not necessarily lead me to embrace all 
forms of libertarianism, such as a belief in freedom for gun ownership or the 
right not to wear a motorcycle helmet. I see the two situations as 
fundamentally different as a matter of liberal political theory. The form of 
libertarianism to which I believe liberal political theory (and our Constitution) 
commit us is far narrower than a generic principle of substantive 
libertarianism. What is deserving of near total protection is what can 
appropriately be called “meta-libertarianism”—in other words, libertarianism 
about participation in the process of exercising liberty. For example, the 
making of appeals to others to seek to influence government to act in a 
particular manner is a form of meta-libertarianism, because it is the exercise of 
liberty to participate in the process of democracy. 
Related to this concept is the fundamental distinction between speech and 
conduct. I have heard all of the arguments as to why speech and conduct must 
be treated as fungible for purposes of constitutional protection.50 But while I 
concede that on occasion the dangers of speech may be as great as those of 
conduct and correspondingly conduct may develop the intellectual and moral 
capacities of the individual as much or more than expression, one must recall 
that when the Framers drafted and ratified the First Amendment they were 
forced to make broad, categorical ex ante judgments. And the simple reality is 
that, for the most part, expression is less acutely harmful either to other 
individuals or to society, and, for the most part, conduct will provide less 
                                                                                                                     
 47 See generally Krotoszynski, Jr., supra note 2, at 665‒73 (discussing REDISH, supra 
note 5). 
 48 See Krotoszynski, Jr., supra note 2, at 672‒73. 
 49 I am reminded of the time, at a conference at Berkeley Law School in 2007, when 
Professor John Harrison suggested that I need to get in touch with my “inner Epstein,” 
referring, of course, to famed libertarian scholar Richard Epstein. 
 50 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 
1292–1300 (1983). 
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direct benefit to the individual’s intellectual development than expression. I 
also recognize that on occasion it will be difficult to separate speech from 
conduct on a conceptual level.51 But the same could be said for virtually all 
legal questions, and the number of occasions on which such a problem will 
arise is likely to be relatively small. Expression and three dimensional 
understanding of language are, for the most part, what distinguish humans 
from the rest of the animal kingdom. It is how we reason, communicate, and 
make decisions. It is therefore quite reasonable for the Framers to have 
decided to extend preeminent protection to expression, rather than to conduct, 
which is relegated to the far lower level of constitutional protection provided 
by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.52 
When it comes to mistrust of governmental action, drawing a speech-
conduct regulatory distinction is equally appropriate. There are few 
governmental actions—short of summary arrests without judicial review or 
discrimination based on considerations of race or religion—more invidious to 
a viable democracy than governmentally imposed selective suppression of 
viewpoints deemed by those in power to be offensive or immoral. As to 
governmental regulations of conduct outside of the two exceptions mentioned, 
however, the populace has already been protected by the intricate system of 
process-based trip wires, speed bumps, and alarms inserted into the 
Constitution as a means of ensuring against precipitous or faction-based 
governmental action. While admittedly this is only true of the federal 
government, restrictions on states imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment 
have, for the most part, effectively limited state governmental abuses. As long 
as proposed governmental regulations of conduct comply with all structural 
constitutional limitations, are subject to full, free, and open debate, and remain 
so following their adoption, the threat of tyranny is not nearly as great as when 
expression has been selectively suppressed. When government censors one 
side of a public debate, the democratic process is fatally aborted. Thus, I have 
no problem, at least in the abstract, with governmental regulation of the 
production and sale of prescription drugs as a means of protecting public 
safety. However, when government allows sale of a drug but restricts truthful 
advertising for that drug, all of the democratic pathologies caused by 
censorship arise. For in such circumstances, government achieves its goal of 
regulation through the back door, thereby confusing or deceiving the public 
into believing that sale of the product is actually unregulated. Suppression of 
                                                                                                                     
 51 Compare Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414–17 (1989) (holding that state’s 
prohibition on desecration of the American flag violates First Amendment because 
regulation is aimed at substance of desecrater’s message), with United States v. O’Brien, 
391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (holding that burning draft card is not protected expression 
because government is regulating the act, rather than the message). 
 52 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730–31 (1963) 
(describing the low level of Due Process protection for economic behavior). 
702 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 76:3 
 
speech advocating lawful conduct, then, enables government to engage in a 
form of stealth regulation of behavior.53 
I should emphasize that by focusing on selective governmental 
suppression of one side of a public debate, I in no way intend to slight the 
value of more private forms of communication. Nor do I let anything turn on 
the motivation of the speaker who seeks to contribute to public debate. 
Promotion of self-interest, as we have already seen, is perfectly legitimate in 
an adversary democratic society. Moreover, given that the ultimate goal of the 
adversary model is to serve as a type of body guard to help protect and 
facilitate achievement of the goal of individual growth and flourishing, 
recognizing the right of each individual to communicate with others who are 
willing to listen flows logically from recognition of the adversary model in the 
first place. 
V. ABSOLUTISM AND THE ADVERSARY FIRST AMENDMENT 
Articulating the theoretical rationale underlying our nation’s commitment 
to free expression on the one hand and determining the extent to which 
expression may be appropriately limited by government on the other hand 
present very different challenges. To be sure, my articulation of a managed 
adversary pluralism model grounded in precepts of mutual mistrust, while no 
doubt controversial, nevertheless tells us a great deal about which types of 
expression are deserving of protection. The model includes within the First 
Amendment’s scope all forms of profit-motivated speech, an expressive 
category often excluded or given significantly reduced protection in the 
scholarly arena in general and in most communitarian-based expressive 
models.54 My model logically casts a particularly mistrustful eye to expressive 
restrictions grounded in either governmental notions of paternalism or 
viewpoint selectivity, since both are inconsistent with the premise of 
individual integrity inherent in the initial commitment to liberal democracy. 
But contrary to Professor Krotoszynski’s apparent assumption,55 outside 
of the two areas just mentioned my model is in no sense logically committed 
to a notion of expressive absolutism, any more than any other model of free 
expression is. For the most part, why we protect expression and how much 
expression we protect are distinct questions. It is true that my model logically 
does categorically exclude the two forms of expressive regulation already 
mentioned, but when government restricts unlawful advocacy or speech giving 
                                                                                                                     
 53 Issues related to governmental suppression of advocacy of unlawful conduct give 
rise to more complicated questions that are beyond the scope of this Essay. For my views 
on that subject, see MARTIN H. REDISH, THE LOGIC OF PERSECUTION: FREE EXPRESSION 
AND THE MCCARTHY ERA 63–131 (2005); MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A 
CRITICAL ANALYSIS 173–211 (1984). 
 54 See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 7; TAMARA R. PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 1–14 (2012). 
 55 See Krotoszynski, Jr., supra note 2, at 666‒73. 
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rise to imminent threats to public safety, or restricts the time, place, or manner 
of expression in reasonable ways, commitment to the adversary pluralism 
model says nothing—one way or the other—about the legitimacy of case-by-
case exceptions to otherwise absolute protection. My prior writing has made 
clear, however, that even though I do not consider myself a First Amendment 
absolutist, I do believe that speech may be regulated only under the most 
compelling circumstances, and that speech advocating lawful activity can 
virtually never be suppressed.56 
VI. CONCLUSION: THE NEED TO RETHINK AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
 The key fallacy of the communitarian models of free expression is not only 
normative; it is empirical as well. The simple fact is that, other than in the 
purely rhetorical sense, our nation has never operated on a one dimensional 
pursuit of the common good. Like it or not, interest groups have played an 
enormously important role in the growth and development of the United 
States.57 The notion that we should view the First Amendment right of free 
expression as some outgrowth of a democratic commitment to collaborative 
efforts to determine a common good is therefore either quixotically naïve or 
downright manipulative. 
 It is certainly true that our system of free expression is not for the faint of 
heart. Speech is often manipulative, underhanded, or downright nasty. But 
there is no other way to assure the continued effective operation of the 
democratic system and promotion of individual growth and development. As 
Madison wrote in Federalist No. 10 in regard to the idea of the suppression of 
factions, the cure here would be far worse than the disease.58 
                                                                                                                     
 56 See sources cited supra note 53. 
 57 See REDISH, supra note 5, at 136–41. 
 58 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 35, at 73 (James Madison). 

